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RÉSUMÉ L’un des premiers actes importants de Charles XIV Jean à la tête de la Suède fut de
renoncer à la reconquête de la Finlande. C’était une position difficile dans les conditions de l’époque
et il balança vraisemblablement plusieurs mois avant de prendre une décision définitive, contraire-
ment à ce qu’il put affirmer par la suite. Le régent puis souverain de Suède fut surtout contraint de
justifier son choix tout au long de son règne et de naviguer entre les écueils de diverses oppositions
plus ou moins structurées. De ce fait, la politique finlandaise fut encore pendant une trentaine d’an-
nées une épine dans le pied du pouvoir royal à Stockholm.
ABSTRACT One of the first important acts of Charles Jean XIV as head of Sweden was to renounce
the idea of reconquering Finland. It was a difficult position to take, considering the conditions of the time,
and in all likelihood, he swung back and forth for several months before taking a definitive decision, con-
trary to what he might have asserted later. Moreover, the regent, then sovereign, of Sweden, was forced to
justify his choice throughout his reign and to navigate between the dangerous reefs of a diverse opposi-
tion, which was organised to varying degrees.Thus, the Finnish policy was, for another thirty years, a thorn
in the side of the royal power at Stockholm.
MOTS CLES Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, Charles XIV Jean, Alexandre Ier, Nicolas Ier, Napoléon Ier,
Israel Hwasser, Suède, Finlande, Russie, guerre russo-suédoise de 1808-1809, conquête de la
Norvège en 1814, affaire du port de Slite, libéraux suédois XIXe.
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Introduction
The loss of Finland in 1809 was considered by a number of Swedes to
be a catastrophe.1 Many of them hoped for its return to the kingdom in
one way or another, some because they were nostalgic for former
grandeur, others because they wanted to snatch their former compatri-
ots from the claws of a reactionary regime. In the 1830s, a book by
Professor Hwasser that encouraged the Finns to remain under the pro-
tective wing of the Russians gave rise to an enormous wave of protests
in Stockholm.2
The crown prince, then king, of Sweden, Charles XIV Jean, chose
an option, however, which was counter to that wanted by a majority of
his new fellow citizens. In the name of peace and prosperity of the king-
dom, he created good relations with his powerful neighbour who sup-
ported his budding dynasty and his ambitions in Norway. Yet, the
stance that he took did not earn him general ignominy. Certainly, there
was some grumbling, but not indomitable opposition nor a systematic
smear campaign, outside a few rather closed circles.3
This relative paradox has of course been a source of questions for
historians, as well as the future sovereign’s bias in favour of expansion
towards the West.
First, for what reasons did Charles Jean choose a line of foreign
policy that might earn him numerous enemies domestically? The expla-
nations offered up until now have not been entirely satisfying, above all
when they excessively personalise relations between the sovereigns4 or
primarily emphasize the Norwegian question. 5
Moreover, how was Bernadotte able to maintain a more or less
constant position while, at the same time, international circumstances
were rapidly changing, especially at the beginning of his reign as prince?
If we put aside the hypotheses of his stubbornness or that of his excep-
tional vantage point, each as difficult to believe as the other, then we
must look for more detailed explanations: Russian pressure,6 dynastic
interests,7 or the practical impossibility of throwing the country into a
war of reconquest.8 Unfortunately, the primary sources do not always
offer easy answers to our questions, which means we have resort to
deductive and inductive reasoning.
Furthermore, by what means was the Swedish sovereign able to
discourage opposition to his Eastern designs? Evidently, cleverness
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alone did not suffice. The circumstances also had to serve his interests,
and a part of the population had to be favourable to his view of things.
Yet, this was not yet the era of public opinion polls, which complicates
the task of the researcher.
Finally, what advantages and disadvantages did Swedish diplomacy
derive from this moderation of its position towards Russia? Most histo-
rians consider that, by favouring peace, this option enabled the eco-
nomic development of the kingdom and the re-establishment of a bal-
anced budget. 9 This is probably not wrong, but only in relative terms,
because the good health of Scandinavian economies depended on exter-
nal factors which their governments did not entirely have a hold over,
for example the orientation of British foreign trade. 10
This article thus humbly proposes to recall certain terms of a com-
plex debate and to offer some avenues for ref lection, from which we
hope to sketch out some preliminary responses to the questions posed
above. In so doing, the reader will probably see a more calculating and
clever Bernadotte than the traditional works on him usually show.
The Loss of Finland: a Tragedy for the Swedes
In February 1808, Gustav IV harvested the bitter fruits of a foreign pol-
icy of provocation that, in any case, he was not able to see through to
the end, as so many economic difficulties piled up, which were linked
to the Continental Blockade and to the domestic political crisis.11 The
conf lict with Russia, who was now allied with Napoleon, rapidly
turned into a disaster, with, as a consequence, the fall of the sovereign
and the loss of Finland, which had been an integral part of the country
for the last 600 years. Contemporaries perceived the event as a great
national tragedy. 
It is true that military operations were particularly traumatic for
Swedish patriots.12 The 21st of February 1808, the Russian general F. W.
von Buxhoevden launched military operations of conquest with an
army of 24,000 soldiers and without any warning. Opposing them,
there were, in theory, 20,000 combatants energized by a rather high
level of morale. However, the commanders were quite mediocre and
they only had 700 cavalry and 46 field guns at their disposal, which was
nothing to speak of. Discipline, moreover, was insufficient. What was
most worrisome, however, was the fact that the defence plan chosen by
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Chief General Klinspor was not up to the task. In no way was he able to
halt the progression of the enemy towards Helsinki and he placed too
much trust in the capacity of maritime fortresses to hold out until the
arrival of reinforcements. The Russians also had an officer of Finnish
origin among their ranks, Georg Magnus Sprengtporten, whose advice
would prove to be invaluable for getting around obstacles.
The 2nd of March, Buxhoevden’s vanguard had already arrived in
Helsinki and the maritime fortress of Svartholm, towards Lovisaa, had
already fallen into the hands of its assailants after making a show of
resistance. Although most of his troops were supposed to be concentrat-
ed around Hämeenlinna, Klinspor decided to move back further north
towards Ostrobothnia because he had learned that the armed groups of
Savo were already beating a retreat towards Kuopio. The first important
battle took place, nevertheless, against Bagration at Tampere, but since
it turned to the disadvantage of the Swedo-Finnish troops, the battle
only hastened the retreat towards Oulu in very difficult conditions. At
the beginning of April, Klinspor was forced to seek protection behind
the Pyhäjoki. The Russians thought that they had already won, which
Caulaincourt confirmed in a letter to Napoleon dated the 5th of April.
Moreover, one month later, much to general consternation, the com-
mander of Sveaborg, a fortress protecting the Gulf of Helsinki and
reputed to be impenetrable, pathetically gave himself up to the enemy.
However, the well-known determination of the Finns in battle had not
been taken into account. A bit after mid-April, they had some success-
es on land which enabled them, among other things, to retake Kuopio
on the 12th of May. This saved the Swedish army from falling apart, for
the time being. New victories were even celebrated during the summer,
such as the one at Lapua (14th July) and Alavus (10th August). Yet,
Klinspor did not know how to take advantage of these victories. In
addition, the conf lict started by the Danes in the south of the kingdom,
as well as the withdrawal of English troops and subsidies, prevented
reinforcements from arriving. Thus, there was a new phase of retreat
from the end of August to the beginning of September that ended in a
temporary armistice signed at Olkijoki the 19th of November 1808 –and
which left the troops in a state of great moral and psychological distress.
One gallant last stand was attempted in the spring of 1809. This sudden
burst of pride, however, was destined to fail. The Russians had consol-
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idated their positions and won over the neutrality of the native elites
through a clever policy of remuneration. 13 Nevertheless, military oper-
ations continued until July 1809 in the far north of the country, and
then beyond what was then the frontier. The Swedish army was no
longer in a position to respond effectively, because it was both exhaust-
ed and decimated. A definitive peace treaty was signed in September
1809 at Hamina, which definitively cut off from Sweden what the Diet
of Porvoo had already named the Great Duchy of Finland, whose sov-
ereign was none other than the Tsar of all Russians, Alexander I.
In Sweden proper, reactions were harsh from the beginning.
Klinspor’s hasty retreat immediately raised bitter discontent because the
population considered it to be a sort of barely disguised f light.  As he
was close to Gustav IV, the sovereign was considered as the main person
responsible for the disaster. With each defeat or surrender, his reputa-
tion deteriorated. The attitude of submission by the Finnish civil
authorities was also very poorly accepted on the opposite shore of the
Gulf of Bothnia. When Alexander I made his famous declaration of 17
June 1808 to the Finns, it was considered as the expression of a secret
agreement. In November 1808, a delegation of important Finnish lead-
ers, led by Baron Mannerheim, was also very badly received by the
inhabitants of Stockholm, who suspected them of wanting to ‘sell’
Russian policy to an increasingly unpopular royal government. In
December, the nomination of the ‘traitor’ Sprengporten to high office
aroused a great sentiment of disgust. Conversely, any sign of resistance
and any temporary success was noisily celebrated, as many hoped to see
in these signs the beginning of a turn in the right direction.
The new defeats of the spring of 1809 were, however, the straw
that broke the camel’s back. A group of conspirators overthrew Gustav
IV on 13 March 1809. Yet, as we know, even this coup d’état with its
patriotic overtones could not reverse the course of events, despite the
conspirators’ determination to punish any acts of weakness. Certainly,
the functioning of the Diet of Porvoo from 27 March 1809 allowed
people to hold onto the idea of revenge just a bit longer, but little by lit-
tle, one had to bow before the evidence: it was urgently necessary to
sign a treaty, which was done with a heavy heart at the beginning of the
summer. A few months after the signature of the peace treaty at
Hamina, General Adlercreutz, one of the most respected figures of the
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new group in power, took to the defence of his Finnish ex-compatriots
before the Diet of Stockholm, the 20th December 1809, by highlighting
the determining role of Finnish soldiers in the fierce resistance of the
previous spring.14 That said, many patriots still held onto the belief of a
future re-conquest, and the choice of Bernadotte as Crown Prince in
1810 had much to do with this desire for revenge which the main con-
spirators personified.
In reality, this dream was a f light of fancy for a number of reasons.
The first was that the alliance between Napoleon and Alexander I was
still in force, and had been since the meeting of Tilsit. We might con-
sider that alliance to be fragile, but it was nonetheless a reality until 1811.
Yet, the more the project of reconquest was delayed, the more Russia
was able to consolidate its military and political presence in Finland.15
The financial situation was also dramatic. Shortages linked to the block-
ade and the war had made prices rise to dangerously high levels.
Smuggling raged on, to the detriment of the poorest people. The State,
heavily indebted, did not dare to raise taxes too high after the fall of
Gustav IV and thus continued to print paper money –money that also
weakened the public’s confidence in the State’s capacity to resolve the
crisis.16 In these conditions, any programme of armament, even the
slightest bit ambitious, would have been difficult to put into place. After
all, the army was in a critical state after the defeats of 1808-1809; in
addition to new equipment, thorough reforms were needed in the
domain of recruiting, which would not be inexpensive. We also need to
remember that, although a warmongering opinion existed, a part of the
Swedish population was weary of the politics of grandeur that had
ruined the country and had increased the misery of ordinary people. In
addition, the former “Bonnets” had maintained some support among a
large part of the bourgeoisie and the land-holding peasantry.17 It would
thus have been difficult to obtain a consensus for a new war expedition.
Finally, as for the Finns, they were no longer inclined to become the
designated victims of new conf licts. Their social elites had, moreover,
appreciated the rather f lexible attitude of Alexander I. The country was
proud to have been recognized as a separate entity within the Empire,
and they simply wanted peace. Any sort of “rescue” expedition would
have appeared dangerous rather than useful. 18
It was in this context that the new Crown Prince of Sweden had
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to make his initial choices. To ignore this fact would be to commit a
considerable error of analysis and to underestimate the qualities of the
solider and statesman that was Bernadotte.
The Initial Choices of Crown Prince Charles Jean, and Why
they are Difficult to Uncover
Our purpose here is to understand why Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte,
definitively chosen as Crown Prince at the beginning of the autumn
1810, was ended up abandoning the idea of revenge on Russia and,
above all, how he was able to impress his will on his subjects. In truth,
the process of his decision-making was probably more complex that has
often been described. In any case, it was never the result of a precon-
ceived idea: that of the establishment of “natural frontiers” by the con-
quest of Norway.
In fact, this latter interpretation has been based on a certain
amount of evidence which demands a degree of caution.  For example,
the former head of the Danish Army recounted in his memoires that, in
1814, during a meeting in Brussels, General Adlercreutz had, in strictest
confidence, affirmed with bitterness that Bernadotte had been contact-
ed in the spring of 1810, in the hope that he would be able to lead a
reconquest of Finland, but that he had very quickly shifted his sights for
Norway.19 This is not an implausible story, although we might be sur-
prised that such a degree of confidentiality could have existed between
those who had been enemies a short time before… Metternich, for his
part, wrote in his memoires that soon after Napoleon had officially
accepted the election of one of his Maréchals to the throne of Sweden
(23 September 1810), Bernadotte, supposedly, during the course of an
evening had unequivocally declared, “I understand the thorns of this
crown which has been offered to me; it was only a small group which
has chosen me, not because they like the looks of me, but as a general
and with the ulterior motive that I would help conquer Finland. Yet, to
undertake a war with that end in mind would be a folly to which I will
not lend a hand.”20 It is always necessary, however, to be wary of apolo-
getic texts written years after the event they describe and in which the
authors seek to prove their own historical importance. These words
were obviously reformulated by someone who knew how the story
would turn out. That said, on 5 February 1811, that is, shortly after tak-
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ing up his Swedish post, when the French ambassador, Alquier, suggest-
ed an invasion of Finland in the Emperor’s name, Bernadotte retorted
rather sharply that he would prefer French assistance to seize Norway.21
It is thus possible to establish a continuity of thought between these two
dates. 
However, putting the facts together in this way is a bit deceptive.
Indeed, in a letter to his wife, Désirée Clarisse, dated 28 March 1811,
and in which he would have had no interest in concealing the truth,
Bernadotte implied that he had thought seriously about Napoleon’s
offer to attack Finland. He noted simply “the difficulty of carrying out
a landing” because of the superiority of English vessels in the Baltic and
“the lack of funds.” For him, 20 million francs would have been need-
ed in order to succeed and he justly reproached the Emperor of the
French for not granting him that sum. Unless we imagine some sort of
ruse on the part of the ex-Maréchal that sought out imperial criticism,
we can logically conclude that Charles Jean had been keeping two irons
in the fire. This means that Bernadotte, as interested as he may have
been by the idea of annexing Norway, did not, in the beginning, make
this an obsession. The argument that he was immediately won over by
the report of Count Balthazar Bogislav von Platen on the Norwegian
question (a document connected to the letter which announced his
election at Örebro 21 August 1810), 22 appears more as a post facto recon-
struction than as definitive proof.
In fact, knowing Bernadotte’s acute sense of power relationships,
we cannot brush aside the hypothesis that he had first sought to satisfy
the majority of the people who had elected him. Very quickly, howev-
er, he would have evaluated the risks of a military expedition to Finland,
both financial, political, and international (that is, Sweden openly
becoming a pawn of the French Empire), and would have opted for a
military accomplishment more within his reach. The fact that he had to
replace Charles XIII at a moment’s notice while the latter was momen-
tarily ill would have also provided him with the occasion to strengthen
the relationships he had formed with the Russians. In fact, Alexander I
had already sent his emissary Czernitcheff to meet the candidate to the
throne of Sweden in Paris.23 Once Bernadotte was definitively seated on
the throne in the Swedish capital, he met him once again in mid-
December 1810. Czernitcheff brought him positive news: the Tsar still
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wanted to push his advantage and, close to Christmas, had a letter sent
offering his “friendship” to the Crown Prince.24 Consequently, the
Russian historian Vadim Roginski thinks that the Russians must have
played a major role in the Crown Prince of Sweden’s choice to compen-
sate in the West what the kingdom had lost in the East. 25
The problem with this attractive hypothesis is that Charles Jean at
first seems to have been unsure about how to respond. One can easily
understand why: he knew that a majority of the Swedes were attached
to the former eastern provinces, and he knew about the desire of
Napoleon to attack Russia soon, but on the other hand, he could see
that the Emperor had no regard whatsoever for Swedish interests. Thus,
he mulled over his response to Alexander I until mid-January. While
the letter was written in a warm tone, the time he took to ref lect on his
answer shows that the author had calculated its effects. In particular, he
underlined the fact that he wished to remain “independent,” without
specifying towards whom, in such a way as to maintain the ambiguity.
During this period, the door remained open to any and all possibilities.26
It was Napoleon’s repeated refusal to commit himself financially,
the cavalier manner with which he treated his former assistant, and his
indifference to Swedish interests that definitively tipped the scales in
favour of Russia.27 The visible animosity with the ambassador Alquier
did not help the situation either.28 Nevertheless, more practical factors
pushed Bernadotte towards an alliance with Russia. He and his advisors
could not help noticing the gradual corrosion of relations between
Denmark and Norway over the last twenty years. They were also aware
of the relative weakness of the Danish army, who had shown themselves
to be incapable in 1808-1809 of beating the few Swedish contingents
who had come to engage them. Between an uncertain landing on the
western coast of Finland and an invasion of a clearly inferior rival that
could very well be victorious, he hardly needed to hesitate. Moreover,
a rapid victory of Napoleon over Russia would mean that the Baltic
powers would be even more subject to the French blockade and thus the
ruin of their ports.
In January 1812, the invasion of Swedish Pomerania –that small
but rich German province of the kingdom– by General Friant’s troops
marked the breaking point. The majority of Swedes judged this show of
force to be inacceptable, which added to the general unpopularity of the
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continental blockade. In order to re-gain Stralsund and its region, the
Russian alliance was obviously decisive. However, in March 1812,
Charles Jean held real power in his hands for a few months with the
slight illness of Charles XIII. He could thus prepare his entourage and
public opinion for a rapprochement with Saint-Petersburg. At this partic-
ular moment, in June, the Great Army surged onto the Russian plain,
brushing past the meagre defences of Barclay de Tolly at first.  With his
political skill, Bernadotte understood that the Tsar would be obliged to
make concessions in the case of a negotiation. Moreover, he also real-
ized that, not only had Napoleon’s troops not taken the route to St.
Petersburg, but they also seemed to be having difficulty on the road to
Moscow. 29 Indeed, as a result of the scorching heat of the summer, the
route had become a deadly trap for the hundreds of thousands of men
lacking water for themselves and fodder for their horses. When the first
great battle took place in August near Smolensk, the Emperor had
already lost a third of his men.30 In addition, when the diplomats of the
“perfidious Albion” (Britain) became aware of the need to intervene for
a Russian-Swedish alliance, Charles Jean jumped at the opportunity.  It
was thus not out of ‘friendship’ for Alexander I, nor out of simple hatred
for Napoleon, and less still from “Norway-mania,” that the Swedish
Crown Prince entered onto the path towards a rapprochement with the
Tsar, but because he was led by a sense of the reality of the situation and
by the hope of being able to make the best of a dangerous situation, in
a conf lict among titans in which he could not play a major role.
At the same time, however, the meeting of Abo (Turku) between
Alexander and Charles Jean, each surrounded by their principal advi-
sors, brought lucrative advantages to Swedish diplomacy as well as to
Bernadotte’s future dynasty.31 Even though the discussions were fierce
from 25th -30th August, they enabled the Crown Prince to lay the foun-
dations for the recomposition of his power and the stabilisation of that
power in the long term. Three clauses seem to have been essential:
- The Swedish treasury received 1.5 million rubles that were needed to
refurbish the Army.
- The Russians accepted the transfer of Norway, in case of war against
Denmark, and committed to furnishing 35,000 men in order to help
win the war if necessary, which was the confirmation of an agreement
that had already been discreetly signed at the beginning of April.
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- The Romanovs supported the Bernadottes against the renewed claims
by the Holstein-Gottorp family to the Swedish throne. At the same
time, the future of the young Oscar became clear thanks to a weighty
ally, at least if the Russian armies carried the day, which was still
uncertain.
The only thing Alexander received in return was the sending of
Swedish troops to defend St. Petersburg in case of attack, a scenario that
was still unlikely at this precise moment in the Russian campaign.
Bernadotte thus got the better of the deal by winning something con-
crete against something hypothetical.
On the other hand, once the retreat from Moscow had started and
the remnants of the Great Army disintegrated bit by bit, the Crown
Prince of Sweden began to fear a reversal on the part of the Russian
authorities, or at least a failure to keep their promises. He had not yet
completely realized the state of exhaustion of Koutousov’s troops,
which prevented them from fully taking advantage of their situation and
which compelled Alexander I to prudence. During the autumn of 1812
and the beginning of 1813, Charles Jean and Charles XIII nevertheless
had to make a great deal of effort to prevent Sweden from being treated
as an insignificant power, in particular in resolving the German ques-
tion. Bernadotte also had the bitter disappointment of seeing Napoleon
try to discredit him in the eyes of Charles XIII.32 The gains of Turku
thus remained fragile for the time being, and Charles Jean was not at all
sure of his future.
This was the main reason behind his famous letter to Alexander I
on 11 June 1813, sent from Stralsund, which was once again occupied
by his troops. At this moment of the war, the Allies had signed an
armistice with Napoleon. However, this could, according to his own
words, “throw a sepulchral veil over Europe,” that is to say, to lead to a
peace favourable to the Emperor. Diving in once again, Bernadotte sug-
gested a face-to-face meeting with the Tsar, so that “no divergence of
opinion” remained between them (proof that such differences did very
well exist). As the Sixth Coalition was being put into place and every-
one’s help was needed, Alexander I could not refuse such an offer, even
more so coming from a former Maréchal of the Empire. On 15 July
1813, the two men met at the castle of Trachenberg, near Breslau
(Wroclaw), at a high-level conference among the allies. Bernadotte
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managed to have himself entrusted with the command of the future
Northern Army that enabled him, when the moment had come, to
swoop down on the rear guard of the Danish army, which was still stuck
in the French alliance. 33
The ‘crossing of the Rubicon’ took place two weeks after the bat-
tle of Leipzig when, in the beginning of November 1813, the Swedish
corps of the Northern Army conspicuously headed for Hanover, then
the south towards the Danish kingdom. On 15 January 1814, after brief
combat, he was able to wrench the Treaty of Kiel from the king of
Denmark, which granted Sweden the Norwegian part of his kingdom.
None of the Allies dared to protest, because the French campaign was
about to start, a difficult moment when it was necessary to pull togeth-
er. 34 The Norwegians still presented a certain resistance by proclaiming
themselves independent for a few months. However, the end result was
no longer in doubt. 35 Above all, in the eyes of Europe, the Finnish page
seemed to have been turned. All that remained, however, was to con-
vince the Swedes, which was not the easiest thing to do.
“Dividere est imperare”, or, the Manoeuvres of Charles Jean to
Make the Swedish Definitively Admit the Loss of Finland
While in the beginning of May 1813, the Crown Prince was en route
for Stralsund at the head of an army whose situation looked dangerous,
a diverse opposition crystallized in the country. A newspaper from the
capital did not hesitate to openly call into question his policy of aban-
doning Finland. In reality, this was a recurrent theme, despite the diplo-
matic successes of the summer 1812. At the slightest sign of weakness,
this subject risked re-appearing in force and diminishing accordingly all
the chances for success of the Norwegian operation which, from now
on, occupied all Bernadotte’s thoughts.
Those most inclined to want to reconquer the Great Duchy were
originally the military and the nobles, like Adlercreutz, who was named
Army Chief of Staff during Bernadotte’s trip to Paris in 1814. Many of
these men were not, properly speaking, opponents, but some of them
situated themselves within the intellectual movement of the ‘chapeaux’
of the 18th century, while others were more or less camouf laged parti-
sans of the Gustavian dynasty. The projects for the incorporation of
Norway seemed hazy to them and without any great economic interest.
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They also put the honour of the country and the army in the fore-
ground. Adlercreutz’s resignation in January 1815 was, in part, dictated
by reasons of age and health. The resignation of such a loyal man reveals,
nevertheless, his great disappointment about the new directions that
Bernadotte was taking.36 One part of the officer corps, in particular the
older men, were also shocked to see veterans of the Finnish war more or
less neglected, like the colonel Johan Fredrik Eek, who was saved in
extremis from debtor’s prison by the generosity of his friends who ended
up substituting for the state to compensate the loss of his Finnish pos-
sessions. 37 Next to this group of malcontents, generally situated on the
right side of the political chessboard, there was also, on the left, a small
group of liberals who were concerned about the promises made to the
Russian autocracy.
A rebellion by the supporters of reconquest was still possible, and
to combat this, Charles XIV Jean showed himself to be less conservative
at the beginning of his own reign (after 1818) than has often been
described. With a fair amount of boldness, he tried to reassure the lib-
erals by criticizing the autocracy behind its back as well as its effects on
Russian foreign policy. In February 1823, for example, before the secret
committee of the Diet, he directed the attention of the audience to the
Tsarist regime’s propensity to put pressure on Sweden. He thundered
against the Russian presence “at the gates of Stockholm” (allusion to
the situation in the islands of Aaland) and considered that the struggle
against absolutism and constitutional regimes would probably be the
great conf lict of the century.38 This was, in his mind, a way to indirect-
ly praise the Swedish constitutional system, which was considered to be
on the correct side of the line, of course, all the while indicating that his
policy of appeasement towards Russia did not imply that he was
renouncing the vital interests of the Nation. The allusion to the Aaland
Islands was a means to underscore his firmness towards an ally who was
sometimes considered to be burdensome. It should be noted, in passing,
that Charles XIV Jean did not at all situate himself in the political line
of Metternich, who had committed himself since 1819 to a merciless
ideological struggle against liberalism and to putting all of Germany
under police surveillance.
In the spring of 1825, the sale of decommissioned warships to the
new republics of South America was also a sign addressed to the liberal
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opposition –to the great displeasure of Alexander I, who was advancing
in age and much less open-minded than at the beginning of his reign.
Moreover, the Tsar took this little ‘rebellion’ very badly and demand-
ed, with Frederic-William of Prussia, (the reactionary sovereign par
excellence), the restitution of the said vessels. In the end, since the United
Kingdom refused to give its support, the sale was annulled in part.
However, Charles Jean did his best to make his ministers appear respon-
sible for Sweden’s backing-down.39 It is clear that he did not want to call
into question the fundamental position he had chosen in 1812, because
it guaranteed the duration of his dynasty and enabled him to refocus the
country’s efforts on economic development. In addition, he did not
want to appear to be a fearful sovereign.
At the very beginning of the 1830s, he once again brought up the
militarisation of the Aaland Islands for discussion and sought the sup-
port of the United Kingdom in order to put pressure on Russia, so that
it would abandon its project of fortifying Bomarsund. Nicolas I wanted
to hear nothing of it and, on the contrary, became threatening.40
Discretion, however, is the better part of valour. It would not have
been a good idea to push his contestation too far, under the pretext of
making himself popular. It would have been dangerous to cut himself
off from the most loyal ally of the throne, the conservatives. It was,
therefore, urgent to reassure them, by creating a line of foreign policy
that sought to establish stability within the country and peace beyond
its borders. The declaration of neutrality, despite its innovative nature,
was the instrument used for this project. Published 4 January 1834, it
inaugurated a new and lasting era of Swedish diplomacy. Indeed, the
double kingdom officially renounced its military policy in such a way
that incensed the short-tempered Nicolas I. Bernadotte re-focused his
actions on economic development and strengthening the union with
Norway, which pleased large entrepreneurs on one hand, and on the
other hand, the partisans for royal authority.
The most committed liberals, conversely, saw this policy as a
renunciation of the criticisms of the autocracy, a sort of guilty absten-
tion of Sweden at the very moment when Europe was beginning to lib-
erate itself from the Holy Alliance. They distanced themselves from
Charles Jean and his government, and multiplied their attacks in the
press against “immobilism”. The conservatives, on the contrary, decid-
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ed to support the sovereign. As a result, the vast majority of them rati-
fied his Norwegian policy, even pushing the king to be more firm
regarding the question of autonomy granted in 1814.41 This meant,
among other things, that the former Gustavians or those who were nos-
talgic for the “chapeaux” no longer made the Finnish question a priori-
ty. On this occasion, Bernadotte scored new points in showing his skill
at strategy.
Even so, relations with Russia did not become idyllic –too many
interests were at stake. In the north of the kingdom, for example, ten-
sions remained high between Swedish fisherman and Russian compa-
nies. Even though they were private individuals, the Swedish state
could not remain indifferent to their problem. The Tsarist authorities,
from their side, encouraged their nationals to act like conquerors.
Charles Jean, moreover, was also very active in the creation of the Slite
Company.42 The goal was to attract a part of British and Western
European maritime traffic towards the island of Gotland. Nicolas I,
however, was firmly decided not to let loose the reins he held over his
Scandinavian neighbour. He organised a surprise visit to Stockholm in
June 1838, during which he discreetly put pressure on the Swedish sov-
ereign to conduct diplomacy in a way that was more accommodating to
Russian interests. One did not have to wait long for the result, rather
humiliating in essence: Charles Jean abandoned the Slite Company to
its own fate and strove, during all the last years of his reign, to avoid
doing anything which might displease the Tsar of all Russians. In so
doing, he implicitly confirmed Sweden’s renunciation of bringing
Finland back to the fold. He also turned his back on the liberal opposi-
tion, who took the opportunity to associate his attitude toward the
Russians with the political and constitutional conservatism at work
within Sweden. To make things worse, the order of peasants at the
Diet, usually favourable to the monarchy, on many occasions expressed
their disappointment at seeing Finland remain in the hands of their
hereditary enemy. The old wound was no longer open, but bitter feel-
ings could occasionally be brought back to life. 43
Another episode, also dating from 1838, underscores this reality. 
A former professor from the University of Turku who had come to live
in Sweden, Israel Hwasser, had just published a work entitled, Om
allianstraktaten emellan Sverige och Ryssland ar 1812. Politisk betraktelse öfver
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Nordens nuvarande ställning [On the Treaty of Alliance of 1812 between Sweden
and Russia. Some Political Reflections on the Current Situation in the North],
in which he praised the foreign policy conducted by Charles Jean. For
him, the decision to conquer Norway rather than to try to recover
Finland had been a wise choice, because Sweden was thus freed from
the heavy burden of national defence. In addition, the separation from
their former mother country had revealed itself to be beneficial for the
Finns, as they were heretofore endowed with their own institutions and
new means to define their economic and spiritual future.44 Hwasser,
whose affection towards the Finns cannot be doubted, thus tried to
come to the aide of sovereign who was rather ill-treated by public opin-
ion during the end of his reign.
The book raised a wave of indignation among the opposition. The
liberal newspaper Dagligt Allehanda (An Assortment of the Daily News) said
forcefully that Finland, in reality, had become a sort of Russian province
without any true liberty. The paper also contested the idea according to
which the Finns, in 1812, had no longer wanted to become a part of
Sweden again. Moreover, it presented the Diet of Porvoo as a simple
publicity stunt orchestrated by Alexander I. Their point of view had no
subtlety, but it ref lected well the state of mind of a number of Swedes.
Another liberal newspaper, Aftonbladet (The Evening News) presented
Israel Hwasser traitorously as a “Russian former professor” who had put
himself in the service of the Tsars and exaggerated the level of Finland’s
autonomy. 45
On the other side of the Gulf of Bothnia, the reception of the book
was very reserved as well, at least in certain circles of national romanti-
cists. Professor Adolf Ivar Arwidsson, who had formerly been in con-
f lict with Hwasser at Turku, published a detailed response in the form
of a small booklet titled Finland and its Future, which he nevertheless
signed under a pseudonym in order to avoid difficulties with the local
authorities and those from St. Petersburg.  In it, he asserted once again
that in 1809 the majority of Finns thought like the Swedes and that the
Diet of Porvoo had merely been “a political parade”. He recognized,
however, the economic progress that had been accomplished since then
and he pointed out that the country had found the conditions for a last-
ing peace beyond its borders. However, he frankly denounced the cen-
sorship in place and called his fellow citizens to continue their efforts to
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strengthen their national identity. In conclusion, he thought that his
colleague Hwasser had only seen the positive side of things and had
embellished the situation. 46
The Finnish policy of Charles XIV Jean, which he never
explained, did not please everyone. In fact, while the initial reasoning of
the Swedish sovereign seems logical, it went against the liberal or
national-romantic sensibilities of the time, which was a significant
handicap for later generations who mostly heard the voices of his oppo-
nents. Moreover, Norway would, in the future, constitute a thorn in
the side of the kingdom. The positive results for Sweden from its posi-
tion of neutrality were thus not really understood or appreciated sever-
al generations later.
Conclusion
What conclusions can be drawn from the preceding discussion? We see
first that, concerning Finland, Bernadotte’s position was probably more
opportunistic than his biographers have previously thought. His knowl-
edge of military aspects and his economic realism certainly made him
quickly see that a reconquest presented more risks than advantages, but
he did, nevertheless, consider this option. Afterwards, circumstances
compelled him to ally himself with the Tsar in order to recover
Pomerania and put an end to the Danish threat.
Overall, Swedish elites by both rank and wealth ended up accept-
ing the Norwegian compensation, not out of enthusiasm but out of
political interest, because the system as a whole conceived of by Charles
Jean represented an effective defence against the most audacious liberal
demands. Yet, there is no doubt that the majority of the population
considered the loss of the Eastern provinces to be a tragedy and the
acquisition of Norway as mediocre compensation. To resist the pres-
sure, this sovereign of French origins thus had to resolve himself to
manoeuvre between different groups and political sensibilities to try to
make them see, despite everything, the soundness of his reasoning.
At the same time, maintaining relations that were, if not cordial, at
least polite with Tsarist Russia was vital for establishing his dynasty
because only the support of the Tsar guaranteed that he would be recog-
nized outside Sweden as a true sovereign despite his revolutionary origins.
It was thus out of the question for him to renounce this relationship.
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As for the fruits of his Finland policy for the Swedish population,
they were not all bitter. A new war would have led to others and would
have placed the Public Treasury in a situation that would have been
impossible to manage, since the paper money supply had doubled
between 1808-1812 without the gold and silver reserves experiencing a
similar increase.47 The disorganisation of commerce following the con-
tinental blockade had, moreover, been deadly to the traditional exports
of iron and lumber –to such an extent that the trade deficit in 1813 was
12 million riksdaler, an enormous figure relative to the size of the coun-
try. The United Kingdom later decided to buy its wood from Canada
for the following twenty years. The consequences were dramatic in
Scandinavia, particularly in Norway. We have to wait until the 1830s to
see a noticeable rise in trade. Metallurgy also suffered an analogous
decline.48 It was thus imperative not to embark upon an uncertain mil-
itary adventure. Above all, it was necessary to concentrate the country’s
efforts on economic development and modernisation, two elements
which presuppose a lasting peace.49 In the end, ironmasters, ship-own-
ers, shopkeepers, and landowners were grateful to Bernadotte for hav-
ing considered their interests. Likewise, many of those nostalgic for mil-
itary grandeur were able to console themselves by obtaining positions
within the government, which was in full expansion. Dreams of
grandeur had not disappeared, but they were dulled by the need to
break out of the doldrums and to adapt oneself to new times.
On the other hand, in the political domain, the personalisation of
power only strengthened the authoritarianism of a sovereign who had
learned so well under Napoleon. As a result, institutions developed less
rapidly than did the economy or the society. This would later lead to
new tensions, which were perceptible at the end of his reign and which
generated protests in all areas, in particular foreign policy.
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